Over the course of recent years, various scientific advances in the realm of reproduction have changed the reproductive landscape, enhancing women's procreative rights and the choices available to them. Uterus transplants (UTx) are the latest of such medical innovations aimed at restoring fertility in women suffering from absolute uterine factor infertility, providing them with the possibility not only of conceiving a genetically related child but also of gestating their own pregnancies. This paper critically examines the primacy of reproductive liberty in the context of uterus transplantation. It questions whether and to what extent we should respect the reproductive autonomy of a woman who chooses UTx, given the significant risks that attach to the procedure and existing concerns that UTx may perpetuate potentially troubling gendered norms surrounding pregnancy and the role of women's bodies in reproduction, which may place undue reproductive pressures on women.
| INTRODUC TI ON
Over the course of recent years various scientific advances in the realm of reproduction have changed the reproductive landscape, enhancing women's procreative rights and the choices available to them. Uterus transplants (hereafter UTx) are the latest of such medical innovations aimed at restoring fertility in women suffering from absolute uterine factor infertility (AUFI), providing them not only with the possibility of conceiving a genetically related child, but also of gestating their own pregnancies. It is estimated that AUFI affects approximately one in 500 reproductive-age women worldwide, 1 for many of whom infertility has devastating consequences. Currently, women with AUFI are 'considered as being "unconditionally infertile"'. 2 Traditional methods of assisted reproduction are unable to treat infertility of this nature, and the only options available to such women seeking to found families are adoption or surrogacy.
UTx in this sense aims to provide women suffering from AUFI with a third option in the management of their infertility. Proponents of the procedure emphasize this unique choice-enhancing potential, whilst detractors focus on the medical and psychological risks it presents.
Fundamentally, the issue of the permissibility of UTx comes back to one of the limits of autonomy. allowing UTx: in Section , that UTx offers something of positive experiential value over and above alternative methods of family creation, and in Section , that offering the procedure to women who choose it respects their reproductive autonomy, which (with some caveats
[Section ]) is something we ought to do. It then turns to examine two of the main arguments against allowing UTx: in Section , that the procedure presents various harms of a physical and psychological nature to the live donor, recipient and children created by it, and in Section , that there are concerns that UTx may perpetuate potentially troubling gendered norms surrounding pregnancy and the role of women's bodies in reproduction, which may place undue reproductive pressures on women. 3 It comes to the conclusion that on current available evidence, UTx arguably meets the harm/benefit threshold such that in order to respect the reproductive autonomy of the woman who chooses it, the procedure ought to be permitted.
| E XPERIENTIAL VALUE OF UTERINE TR AN S PL ANTATI ON
In order to fully appreciate the nature of the issues at stake for women who may seek UTx, it is important to consider the value that the procedure may hold in both an experiential and a symbolic sense.
AUFI is defined as the 'absence of the uterus, or the presence of a non-functional uterus'. 4 The condition is thought to affect more than 12,000 women of childbearing age in the U.K. alone, with causes attributed to various conditions from the genetic disorder MayerRokitansky-Küster-Hauser syndrome to cervical cancer. 5 For women with AUFI who wish to experience motherhood, their only recourse is either adoption or surrogacy (where legally permitted).
For some women, the presence of a genetic and/or gestational link between mother and child may be of little importance, and adoption offers a satisfactory route to motherhood. For others, a genetic link may be of more significance, and in this case gestational surrogacy (where the implanted embryo is created using the intended mother's and father's gametes) is currently the only way to achieve this.
It is self-evident that the experience offered by uterus transplant is unique, aiming to parallel as closely as possible the reproductive experience of the naturally fertile woman, in the sense that a woman undergoing UTx will gestate and carry to term a pregnancy, looking no different from her fertile pregnant counterpart to the outside world. This is something that surrogacy and adoption simply cannot provide.
For those who view the pregnancy experience as providing something of value, this type of transplant captures what some women with AUFI may perceive to be the 'authentic' motherhood experience.
Society undoubtedly places a high value on the pregnancy experience, though this is not only relevant to the way we perceive motherhood: UTx has also been described as offering 'a way for these women to re-discover their own femininity through the restoration of fertility'. Increased choice alone, however, is of purely formal benefit if an individual has neither the capacity nor the opportunity to exercise such choice. 11 Having set out why UTx may be something that appeals to some women with AUFI, we must now turn to examine the concept of reproductive autonomy in both a moral and a legal sense, and the related notion of procreative liberty. Only then may we begin critically to question the parameters of reproductive decisionmaking in the transplantation context. defines procreative liberty at its most general level as 'the freedom to either have children, or to avoid having them'. 27 Establishing a theoretical framework for his understanding of the concept, he states:
| AN ACCOUNT OF REPRODUC TIVE AUTONOMY
The 
33
Of course, offering treatment in a free healthcare system is one thing; controlling who has access to ensure the fair distribution of resources is another and often leads to demand far outstripping the available supply-the patchy provision of IVF services in the U.K. being a clear case in point here. 34 The English Court of Appeal in Burke held that 'autonomy and the right of self-determination do not entitle the patient to insist on receiving a particular medical treatment regardless of the nature of the treatment'. 35 As we might suspect then, in practical terms, given the fact that the National Health Service (NHS) is a publicly funded healthcare system, for reasons of distributive justice and fair rationing policy, the state simply cannot facilitate an unfettered right of access to assisted reproductive technology (ART), 36 and so any formal reproductive rights (underpinned by notions of reproductive liberty and autonomy) in English law should be understood as negative rights to non-interference.
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Having analysed the concept of reproductive autonomy in both a moral and a legal sense, we now have a point from which we can begin to evaluate the purported value of UTx (as mentioned above)
versus the known risks of complication and potential harm that may be caused by the procedure, in order to be able to come to an informed conclusion on the primacy and limits of reproductive autonomy in the UTx context. 27 Ibid., p. 22. 28 Ibid., p. 30. 29 Ibid. 
| THE LIMITS OF REPRODUC TIVE AUTONOMY
As noted earlier, following a Millian account of liberty, an individual is generally regarded as sovereign over his own life, unless the benefits of making autonomous choices in accordance with one's own project of self-making are outweighed by the risk of harm to others.
Inasmuch as that society has a moral reason to respect the autonomous decisions of individuals, it also has a duty to prevent harm to others, and it is this duty that grounds society's interest in the direction of assisted reproduction (AR). If the risks of harm posed by
UTx are deemed to be of such significance that they outweigh the benefits, then UTx will be unacceptable and should not enter routine practice. Correspondingly, if English law is broadly Millian in its approach, we would expect it to be wary of UTx. Having said that, if there is no reason to think that UTx would be especially harmful to others, the presumption would be that it ought to be allowed. 
| Risk of harm and defective consent
The risk of physical and psychological harm to the live donor is evident. Donation requires that she undergo hysterectomy, a major abdominal surgery that is not clinically necessary. Whilst this poses no risk in deceased donation, as Williams points out, 'retrieval in live donation necessitates physical harm to the donor and includes small but not insignificant risks of long-term morbidity and mortality thought similar to, or only slightly higher than that of a total abdominal hysterectomy'. 40 In the Swedish trial, it was reported that the mean operative time for donor surgery was 11.6 hours, compared with 4.7 hours for the recipient surgery. 41 Surgical risk remains one of the major concerns with the procedure, particularly for the donor, given the highly invasive nature of the operation to retrieve the uterine veins and the length of the operation, meaning that general anaesthetic is required. 42 It is hoped that the use of robotic-assisted surgery will sig- where similar risks do not serve as justification to prevent donors of livers or kidneys from donating. Where risks are manageable, and the procedure has some corresponding benefit for the recipient, it ought to be for the individual donor herself to weigh up the benefits and risks of the procedure. Whilst benefit in the case of UTx may be harder to identify, given that the procedure is non-life-saving in purpose, it exists in the form of a positive psychological experience-the satisfaction of having enabled the recipient to attempt to carry her own pregnancy.
Organ donation in the U.K. operates on the basis of an altruistic model. Under English law, the decision to donate must be voluntary, informed, and the patient must have capacity to consent to the procedure following the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 49 The risk of coerced or induced consent is not unique to uterine transplantation.
The NHS has robust counselling and assessment procedures in place for other forms of live donation to ensure that consent is valid and that no reward for donation has been sought, 50 and this would undoubtedly extend to UTx. It is true that the nature of the transplant differs somewhat from that for kidneys and livers, in that the donor has to be sure that they have completed their own family and no longer requires the organ. In this sense, whilst an enhanced counselling and consent process may be required to ensure that donors fully comprehend the nature and consequences of their decision, there is no reason to think that unique concerns here provide sufficient reason to prohibit the procedure. Arguably, the benefits of respecting the reproductive autonomy of both the donor, in deciding that she no longer wishes to have any more children and is prepared to lose her biological capacity to do so, and the recipient, in wishing to constitute her family in a way that is meaningful to her, sufficiently outweigh the potential negative consequences. This, however, is not to ignore data relating to the incidence of premature birth and low birth weight in transplant recipients, which warrants careful consideration. 57 Indeed, both prematurity and low birth weight are known to increase the risk of infant morbidity and mortality. 58 In pregnancy outcomes recorded on the U.K. Transplant
| Harm to recipient and fetus

| Risk of physical harm
Pregnancy Registry, of 149 live births between 1994 and 2001, 51%
were premature and 54% of babies born were of low birth weight. 59 Preterm delivery and low birth weight occurred in both the reported live births by UTx in Sweden. 60 antibiotics'. 65 It should be noted, however, that the same patient was reported to be in good health 12 months after childbirth. 66 Whilst these data present concrete evidence of the health risks posed by UTx, in the exercise of reproductive autonomy, the question whether a woman who would choose this treatment ought to be able to navigate risks to her health alone is raised. Indeed, more generally when it comes to healthcare decisions, as previously stated, English law will not (usually) interfere with a patient's treatment decisions. 67 Of course, however, the issue is not as simple in the case of UTx, given the potential risks that the treatment poses to the health of the developing fetus and future child. Although the fetus has no legal personality in law, 68 it may hold some degree of moral significance, 69 and it is for this reason that wider society has an interest in determining the acceptability of the procedure.
| Risk of psychological harm
Regarding the risk of psychological harm to the future child owing to the atypical nature of gestation and birth, at this stage and absent evidence to suggest otherwise, similarities may be drawn from the psychosocial experience of children born through surrogacy.
Longitudinal studies of surrogate-born children (by IVF or artificial insemination) demonstrate that 'there were no significant differences in children's total SDQ [strengths and difficulties questionnaire] scores between family types for either mothers' or teachers' ratings'. 70 On the possibility of bias in maternal reporting of child behaviour, the authors note that the teacher questionnaire 'provided an independent rating of the presence of emotional or behavioral problems in the children that confirmed the mothers' reports'. 71 Any such concerns may be more acute in cases of possible future transgender UTx and male UTx, but current research involves transplant only in female patients. Again, at this stage in the research, it is not possible to determine whether being born by UTx may cause psychological harm, similar to, or above, that which may be experienced by children born through surrogacy and/or IVF, and whether any such harm is significant to the extent that the procedure should not be allowed. This is something that can only be assessed as fur- It is right to be concerned here, and this may be a place where we would at least want to consider limiting reproductive liberty.
Consider, for example, the case of multiple embryo transfer (MET) and the health risks this poses to both mother and developing 93 Whilst no empirical research has yet been published identifying the motivating factors behind the decisions of the women signed up to the UTx trial in the U.K., the British transplant team has published a guide 'patient pathway' protocol, 94 including questionnaire forms to be filled out by participants in the trial, with a section exploring patient motivation in opting for surgery. 95 When analysing the extent to which choice in this context may be shaped by the social pressure to reproduce and experience pregnancy and childbirth, it is important to remember that UTx is not unique in this sense (although concerns here may be heightened).
| SO CIAL PRE SSURE
The decision to undergo IVF treatment encompasses many of the same issues, and, presumably, at least some of the same motivations also underpin this choice, and yet IVF is now an accepted common practice, with more than 240,724 babies born in the U.K. after IVF treatment between 1991 and 2013. 96 Jackson neatly summarizes the interplay between reproductive choices and external influences when she states that, 'individuals cannot exist in … a social and cultural vacuum … Reproductive decisions, in particular, will obviously be informed by the rich network of relationships and cultural expectations within which each individual is situated'. 97 While this, of course, becomes a problem should women feel obliged to choose a certain option in order to fulfil certain societal and cultural expectations, we have no more reason to suspect that this is the reason women may choose UTx than the understandable desire to experience pregnancy. It is possible that to a woman with AUFI, UTx presents the better of two similarly 'risky'
options when compared with surrogacy, the difference being that, as opposed to externalizing the risk of gestation in surrogacy and the legal complexities involved therewith, in UTx a woman chooses to internalize and assume that risk herself.
Generally, we do not seek to influence or curtail an individual's choice in natural reproduction, nor do we question the authenticity of the same, citing concerns regarding social pressures of procreation, and thus in this sense we have no more reason to do so with regard to UTx as a treatment option. Thus, despite worries that may exist involving the perpetuation of gendered norms and cultural expectations, where a woman is provided with an additional (albeit risky) option to treat her infertility, the mere presence alone of such social and cultural norms does not necessarily preclude at least a prima facie claim that we should respect the reproductive autonomy of the woman choosing the procedure.
| CON CLUS ION
This paper set out to examine the primacy of reproductive autonomy and the question of whether we should respect the choice of a woman who desires UTx, thinking that she will achieve a greater sense of wellbeing while the opposite may be true, taking into consideration the risks of harm to the live donor, recipient and developing fetus. The nature and importance of autonomy was explored both morally and in law in order to unpick the backdrop of interests against which this new reproductive technology is set. As I indicated earlier in this paper, UTx is an experientially unique form of AR, which aims to treat a subset of female-factor infertility previously deemed untreatable. It has increased the reproductive options available to women with AUFI who previously had recourse only to surrogacy or adoption to create their families. Current evidence does not suggest that the risks of harm posed by the procedure outweigh the potential benefits to be derived from respecting the choice to undergo donation and transplant-namely, the inherent value in respecting the autonomous decision of an individual to live a life in accordance with their wishes. At present, any conclusions presented here must be restricted to the clinical trial context, as further data collection is required in order to decide on the moral permissibility of treatment in routine clinical practice (similar to the process by which mitochondrial replacement therapy was evaluated here in the U.K.). This is not something that women should navigate alone, owing to the nature of the risks involved and the interest that society has in the direction of human reproduction. Reproductive decisions concern some of the most intimate spheres of our lives, and whilst society has an obligation to prevent harm to others, for as long as UTx meets the harm threshold and the possible risks of treatment do not outweigh the benefits, we ought to respect the reproductive autonomy of a woman who wishes to undergo the procedure.
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